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unlocking action to prevent global warming in excess of 2 degrees Celsius by enabling investment in a low-29 carbon transition at scale. It is estimated, for instance, that an additional $800 billion of investment in low-30 carbon activities will be required each year in order to stay under this threshold (Campiglio, 2016; European 31 Commission, 2018; McCollum et al., 2013 ; Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2016). However, 32 current investment levels fall well short of what is calculated as necessary to meet global targets (Buchner et 33 al., 2017; Campiglio, 2016) , despite the unprecedented policies of cheap money pursued by the leading central 34 banks in the wake of the global financial crisis and the recent expansion of financial markets that are variously 35 termed 'green' (City of London Corporation, 2016), 'sustainable' (DB Climate Change Advisors, 2012), or 36 'environmental' (Bertl, 2016) . The growing emphasis on 'finance flows' as a means to decarbonization is 37 significant, nonetheless. It not only marks a significant shift away from carbon trading and heralds a 38 recognition of its limitations as a market-based strategy for low-carbon transition (Bryant, 2018; Ervine, 2014; 39 Lane and Newell, 2016), but also requires a critical social science agenda capable of attending to the diverse 40 forms of what we term 'carbon finance' that are now being mobilized towards this end. In this paper we seek 41 to both pluralize the understanding of carbon finance within human geography and the social sciences, and to 42 problematize the various processes through which carbon is translated into financial value. 43
First, we seek to map out the terrain of multiple and relatively discrete forms of carbon finance that 44 explicitly seek to act on carbon emissions alongside the extraction of financial value. We adopt the term carbon 45 finance to expressly avoid confusion with the alternative rubric of 'climate finance' that conventionally and 46 narrowly refers to donor funding or development aid consistent with the principles of the United Nations 47 Bank, 2017) . To delineate carbon finance, we draw into conversation literatures on the 49 governing of climate change, the political and cultural economies of carbon markets, and wider bodies of 50 research concerned with 'neo-liberal natures' (Bigger and Dempsey, 2018) and the 'financialization of nature' 51 . While it is indeed the case that, as Felli (2014: 252) observes, "the climate governance 52
'regime' appears extraordinarily complex, specialised, even unfathomable", this body of work enables us to 53 identify the principal forms which carbon finance adopts as its strategic significance grows within that regime. 54 3 These include: markets that price and trade emissions rights (Callon, 2009; Knox-Hayes, 2016; McKenzie, 2009; 55 Lovell, 2015) and ecosystem services (e.g. Asiyanbi, 2016; Corbera, 2012; Fletcher et al., 2016; Gupta et al., 56 2012 ); forms of investment in natural capital designed to generate value through conservation and carbon 57 sequestration (Dempsey, 2015; Fairhead et al., 2012; Kay, 2018; Sullivan, 2018) ; and, raising capital expressly 58 for low-carbon investment in enterprises, projects and initiatives (Bracking, 2015; Christophers, 2016 Christophers, , 2018 ; 59 Karpf and Mandel, 2018) , especially to provide for the greening of urban infrastructures (Castree and 60 Christophers, 2015; Knuth, 2018a) and the renewable and 'clean tech' energy sectors (Hall et al., 2017; Knuth, 61 2018b; McCarthy, 2015) . 62
Our second motivation in this paper is to problematize carbon finance in all of its different forms. In 63 the context of contemporary climate change governance, problematizing carbon finance is essential if we are 64 to move beyond narrow questions about the scale of finance flows that -animated by assertions of a 'carbon 65 finance gap' between the size of the decarbonization challenge and the current levels of finance being directed 66 towards it -tend to preoccupy policymakers. In the first instance, 'problematization' is a methodological 67 approach (Foucault, 2003) . It directs our attention to consider how the problem of climate change is itself 68 rendered governable in such a way that carbon finance appears capable of providing for solutions and securing 69 the future of life (Langley, 2019) . As Sullivan (2018) has shown for investment in biodiversity and ecosystem 70 services, for example, the method of problematization lends itself to the grounded investigation of the 71 conditions of possibility and practicalities of carbon finance. Such a method is also broadly consistent with 72 wider calls for a more pragmatic research orientation to the financialization of nature (Castree and  73 Christophers, 2015; Ouma et al., 2018) , particularly one that suspends theoretically-driven judgements on the 74 systemic contribution of capital switching via the financial markets for addressing the 'second contradiction of 75 capitalism' and providing a purported 'socio-ecological fix' (Ekers and Prudham, 2015; see Harvey 1978 see Harvey , 1982 . 76
Notwithstanding that carbon finance is conducted on the basis of the maximization of (albeit more 77 sustainable) capitalist growth, problematization is a method that questions the privileged role of carbon 78 finance in meeting the challenges of climate change and which pragmatically centres on the relational 79 processes, contingencies and limits of the various and discrete forms taken by carbon finance. 80
Our agenda for problematizing carbon finance is thus also an intervention in theoretical and 81 conceptual debates that are present across the literatures we bring into conversation here. We will develop 82 two related lines of argument that cut across the political economy and cultural economy approaches which 83 dominate the literature. First, the critical analysis of carbon finance as a broad research terrain requires 84 specific attention to the variegated processes through which carbon is incorporated into the extraction of 85 financial value. Considerable work is necessary for carbon -as a material and discursive quality (e.g. high vs. 86 low-carbon) -to be translated into financial value. We take seriously, then, recent arguments which stress that 87 even though the abstraction of value from its material forms is a necessary part of the financialization of 88 nature, "it is vital that we do not portray the environment as a flat terrain over which financial investment can 89 be unproblematically stretched" (Kay 2018: 172 ; see also Asiyanbi, 2017) . The materiality and spatiality of 90 carbon matter to the ways in which carbon finance is made, and to the political economies it enables. While 91 we draw on a broader literature concerning the financialization of nature that stresses the "frictional 92 encounters of finance and nature" (Ouma et al., 2018: 501) , we focus specifically on the frictions that arise 93 from carbon's particular social, political, spatial and material qualities. 94
Second, no single category can adequately conceptualize the contingent processes through which 95 carbon is translated into financial value across carbon finance's multiple forms. Although it is now widely 96 questioned by political economists who have recently settled on the category of 'rent' for analysing the 97 extraction of financial value from nature (Andreucci et al., 2017; Felli, 2014) , we find commodification provides 98 for an effective conceptualization of processes of carbon finance that feature speculative trading, especially 99 when rights to emit carbon are priced and exchanged on carbon markets. However, speculation on carbon is 100 but one mode of financialized accumulation on nature (Bryant, 2018; Ouma et al., 2018) . Recent research into 101 investment in natural capital and low-carbon technologies and infrastructures -some of which explicitly 102 conceptualizes the extraction of financial value in these forms of carbon finance as 'rent', and some which 103 does not -is pointing to the important ways in which carbon is figured as an 'asset' that can generate future 104 revenues, and thereby act as collateral for the leverage of debt and creation of interest-bearing capital (Kay, 105 2018; Knuth, 2018a, 2018b; Sullivan, 2018). Our conceptual contribution explicitly connects this research with 106 an emerging body of work in cultural economy that, via the categories of 'assetization' and 'capitalization', 107 furthers critical analysis of economization processes that leverage debt for capital investment (Birch, 2017a, 108 2017b; Muniesa, 2017; Muniesa et al., 2017; Ouma, 2016 Ouma, , 2018 . Assetization is the process of turning all 109 manner of things into "capitalized property" that generates an income stream and entails liabilities and 110 obligations (Birch, 2017a : 468, original emphasis). It is thus inseparable from capitalization as "a technique for 111 prospective valuation" (Muniesa et al., 2017: 12) , wherein, from the perspective of the investor, "financial 112 value amounts to a future return anticipated through a calculation of the cost of capital rather than to a 'price' 113
given to the asset on the market" (Muniesa 2017: 449) . We seek to contribute, then, to calls for further 114 research into how nature comes to be regarded as an investable proposition , but suggest 115 more rigorous understanding of these processes in carbon finance also requires insights from studies of 116 assetization and capitalization in other domains. In sum, our agenda for the problematization of the processes 117 of carbon finance in all of its forms extends from the relatively well-known difficulties of making carbon-as-118 commodity to the presently under-researched impediments of producing carbon-as-asset. 119
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. Section II reviews research on carbon-as-120 commodity within human geography and allied fields. Section III turns to consider research that questions the 121 relevance of commodification processes for critical understanding of the extraction of value across carbon 122 5 finance. We explain why we want to retain a concern with carbon-as-commodity whilst, at the same time, 123 developing a conceptualization of carbon-as-asset through the cultural economy literature on assetization and 124 capitalization. Section IV illustrates our agenda for pluralizing and problematizing carbon finance by focusing 125 on a key form of carbon finance -raising capital for low-carbon investment -that has received comparatively 126 little attention to date. Our specific focus is on low-carbon investment in electricity generation, and we draw 127 critically on applied and policy research to tease out some of the difficulties of rendering carbon-as-asset in 128 this domain of carbon finance. Section V offers concluding reflections on how an agenda that pluralizes and 129 problematizes carbon finance can be taken forward in human geography and related fields. (ETS) and various other regional carbon markets based on carbon allowances, including in Australia, China, 140
Canada and the USA. Carbon markets are widely envisaged as a response to 'negative externalities' -i.e. the 141 emissions that are produced but not owned by market actors. Producers are incentivised to not only reduce 142 emissions, but also to 'direct investment into lower-carbon technologies' (Keohane, 2016: 27) . As with all 143 forms of market exchange, however, carbon markets rely on creating carbon as a commodity that can be 144 priced and traded. Commodification, therefore, has been the primary focus for critical geographical and social 145 scientific research over the past decades into the making of carbon markets. 146
Research on carbon's commodification has been shaped by two broad perspectives: political economy 147 and cultural economy. Those working within the tradition of geographical political economy have approached 148 carbon markets with an eye for the dynamics of commodification they set in train, informed by wider interests 149 in the forms of appropriation (property) that underpin the creation of markets and the growing role of "nature 150 as accumulation strategy" (Smith, 2006) . Others highlight more directly how carbon's commodification has 151 created specific opportunities for finance capital, and the constellation of financial actors associated with the 152 promotion, implementation and monitoring of carbon markets. Janelle Knox-Hayes (2016), for example, 153 skilfully shows how the market infrastructures that produce carbon-as-commodity divorce the use value of 154 resources from the exchange value of financial instruments, unleashing a financialized form of accumulation 155 centred on speculation around fluctuating prices (see also Bigger, 2016; Knuth, 2015) . A related line of political 156 6 economy inquiry examines how markets for carbon and ecosystem services enable accumulation, but at the 157 expense of landscapes and communities drawn into the production of carbon offsets or reliant on such 158 ecosystem services for their livelihoods and survival (Bachram, 2004; Bumpus and Liverman, 2011; Fairhead 159 et al., 2012; Paterson, 2010) . Bumpus and Liverman (2008) , for example, argue that offset schemes rely on 160 existing patterns of uneven development to find 'efficient' forms of carbon reduction, enabling a process of 161 "accumulation by decarbonization" in the global North through production of carbon credits in the global 162
South. 163
Research on the commodification of carbon from a cultural economy perspective has also addressed 164 carbon markets and markets for biodiversity and ecosystems services. It points to the development of 165 elaborate apparatus through which carbon is either made into a unit commensurate with both other sources 166 of (reduced) emissions and with monetary worth, or which enable the capacities and qualities of a range of 167 entities (from forests to houses) to forego (future) carbon emissions to hold value. This suggests that processes 168 of carbon-as-commodity take multiple forms around which different kinds of economy are assembled, 169 allowing for (and excluding) different kinds of socio-material relations and their outcomes. Here the seeming 170 intangibility of carbon has led to a focus on the performative socio-technical processes through which carbon 171 is commodified (Callon, 2009; McKenzie 2009 ). Because "carbon is a new and unusual commodity", cultural 172 economy thus emphasizes how "credible systems of measurement and calculation are especially important" 173 to the development of carbon finance (Lovell, 2015: 127; see also Asiyanbi, 2017) . The stabilization of carbon-174 as-commodity requires significant work, as Lovell (2015: 127) explores in the context of the forest carbon 175 market where marketization "has been, to date, almost entirely centred on debates about the measurement, 176
reporting and verification of the carbon stored in forests". 177
The complex processes of carbon-as-commodity are tied up with the nature of carbon itself. Rather 178 than being a commodity in the strictest sense of being a good that can be bought or sold, the trading of carbon 179 is more like the buying and selling of services -where the service is the calculated and qualified ability to well be an example of "accumulation by conservation" (Büscher and Fletcher, 2015) . Work in cultural 187 economy, however, reveals the complex set of calculations and translations required for forests (and other 188 ecosystems) to generate financial returns from for the 'services' they provide. 189 7 Reading across the political economy and cultural economy literatures that foreground the processes 190 of carbon-as-commodity in carbon markets and ecosystem services, we can highlight two insights that are 191 particularly relevant for problematizing the processes of carbon finance. First, research has shown how 192 commodification is a precarious achievement, "a process of ontological reconfiguration through which 193 different qualities of nature and resource-based production are translated into a financial value form to be 194 traded in specialized markets" (Ouma et al., 2018: 2). The key point here is that value is neither latent in 195 material things (an inherent property, awaiting capture) nor a product of discursive claims (a projection onto 196 the world), but an achievement that entails bringing materialities, relations and discourses into alignment. 197
Through the production and maintenance of these alignments, carbon can be made to bear value as a 198 commodity that can be priced, traded and speculated upon. In turn, the performativity of markets should not 199 be read (only) as an abstract set of techniques or forms of calculation by which carbon comes to be made 200 valuable and fungible, but also as "practices that are imbued with a materiality … [such that they] become 201 material interventions into how economic action unfolds" (Lansing, 2012: 207) . 202
Second, research into the peculiar 'immateriality' of carbon-as-commodity highlights processes of 203 abstraction and "matters of measure" that are "used…to define adequate bearers of value" (Robertson, 2012: 204 388) . Early work on markets in ecosystem services commented frequently on their strangely 'immaterial' 205 character -i.e. how value is expanded not by the circulation of carbon per se, but by the exchange of a qualified 206 abstraction acting as a proxy for an environmental service. However, as Robertson (2012) points out, markets 207 in ecosystem services only look peculiar because we are accustomed to value circulating in the form of physical 208 commodities (such as copper, coal or grain). Furthermore, he argues, the reason we see this as the normal 209 way of things is that getting many classic materials (like coal) to bear value requires their physical 210 displacement. Or, to put it another way, capital has been unable to figure out a way to commodify coal without 211 its physical extraction and circulation. Ecosystem services, on the other hand, can be made to bear value in 212 ways that do not require physical circulation of the underpinning materials: markets for ecosystem services 213 rest on "the creation of a set of general abstractions adequate to allow nature to circulate -not just as 214 commodified bits of material, but as financial and service commodities" (Robertson, 2012: 388) . By taking 215 seriously the "process of creating socially-necessary abstractions that are adequate to bear value in capitalist 216 circulation", Robertson (2012: 386) opens up for discussion the different forms in which carbon can be made 217 to bear value, the techniques of classification and categorization through which this occurs, and the "the work 218 (that) must be done to convince observers that these simplifications are adequate to the task of observes that the right to emit greenhouse gases has "legally become a necessary condition of production", 236 "both a limitation and a right of access" for capitalist commodity production. As a consequence, "the 237 distribution and circulation of (carbon allowances) through market-based mechanisms" should not be 238 understood as speculative accumulation on carbon-as-commodity, "but rather as a form of rent" (2014: 254). what the concept of commodification brings to critical analysis of carbon finance. Here we underscore how 255 commodification centres attention on the extraction of value through speculative trading on the price of things 256 that have been made exchangeable. Rights to emit carbon may be analogous to land as property and have no 257 9 value in strict Marxist terms, as Felli argues, but they nonetheless do have a use-and exchange-value. In other 258 words, Felli's analysis does not foreclose the critical purchase of commodification for understanding 259 speculative trading within carbon markets. In Kay's (2018) detailed study of the emergence of conservation 260 finance in the US, for example, such schemes are shown to feature arbitrage pricing that depends upon existing 261 markets for land and other physical commodities. Precisely because it centres attention on speculation, the 262 concept of commodification is similarly important to Bryant's (2018) nuanced analysis of the development of 263 the EU ETS. He is clear that, notwithstanding the processes of carbon-as-commodity, "to date, carbon has 264 become capital only occasionally rather than systemically" due to the political conditions of its making and its 265 persistent low market worth (ibid., 615). Carbon markets are therefore not witnessing the leveraging of debt 266 against carbon (i.e. they have not enabled interest-bearing capitalization). In practice, the logics and 267 mechanisms of carbon commodification have developed in ways that allow for only the restricted and 268 speculative extraction of financial value. 269
Third, we regard Felli's (2014) contribution to be productive for the problematization of carbon finance 270 because it highlights the need to go beyond the category of commodification for understanding processes of 271 carbon finance. His analysis points to how other political economies -in this case, of rent extraction and 272 circulation -are constituted, at least in part, through the translation of carbon into financial value. It is clear 273 for Felli (2014) that these processes rest primarily on the making of property relations. However, it is 274 significant, we suggest, that others developing Felli's (2014) analysis tend to slide from his concern with 275 property rights and "pseudo-commodities" into a concern with 'assets', a category that which explicitly conceptualizes the extraction of financial value in these forms of carbon finance as 'rent', and 281 some which does not -is also pointing to the important ways in which carbon is figured as an 'asset' (Kay, 282 2018; Knuth, 2018a, 2018b; Sullivan, 2018) . This work recognises the creation of assets that can generate 283 future revenues as crucial to the extraction of financial value, not least because assets simultaneously act as 284 collateral for the leverage of debt and creation of interest-bearing capital. Sullivan (2018: 56), for example, 285 explores how framing nature as 'natural-capital' has led it to being considered more or less literally as "a bank 286 of financial assets … [or] 'countable capital'". In this sense, nature (and carbon more specifically) come to be 287 regarded as 'financial' when they attract financial investment, that is, when they become 'assets'. 288
To advance this analytical turn towards processes of asset-making taking place across different forms 289 of carbon finance, we suggest that it is productive to connect with emerging cultural economy research that 290 explicitly articulates the categories of 'assetization' and 'capitalization' (Birch, 2017a (Birch, , 2017b Muniesa, 2017; 291 Muniesa et al., 2017) . Others are also beginning to forge this connection in relation to the financialization of 292 nature, broadly understood (Ouma, 2016 (Ouma, , 2018 . For Ouma et al. (2018: 501) , then, nature's financialization is 293 "linked to the more general assetization of almost everything" (see Leyshon and Thrift, 2007) . For us, however, 294 the key point from this emergent cultural economy work is that the contingent processes that turn carbon into 295 assets are quite different to the making of carbon-as-commodity. This is because, in contrast with 296 commodities, assets are always already "capitalized property" (Birch, 2017a: 468, original emphasis); that is, 297 they leverage debt against an expected income stream and necessarily entail liabilities, repayments and other 298 obligations to investors. 299
To be regarded as an investable proposition in the first instance, an asset is deemed to be capable of 300 bearing financial value not primarily because of its potential use-or exchange-value (although it might 301 subsequently be commodified and speculated upon as a transferable ownership claim). The process of 302 'becoming asset' is primarily a matter of the potential to generate future returns on capital ( In sum, the extraction of financial value across the various forms of carbon finance certainly features 315 secondary trading and speculation on prices, and focusing on the contingent processes of carbon-as-316 commodity is crucial to the problematization of carbon finance in this respect. However, this should not 317 obscure significant differences between capital and (pseudo-)commodity marketizations, regardless of how 318 'immaterial' and speculative the commodity markets in question might be. The problematization of carbon 319 finance therefore also needs to be attuned to the production of carbon as an 'asset class' (see Kay, 2018) , 320 foregrounding the exigencies of assetization and capitalization processes and the difficulties of rendering 321 carbon-as-asset. Crucial to the juridical and socio-technical achievements and abstractions that stabilize 322 carbon-as-asset, we argue, is capitalization: that is, how a specific carbon sequestration initiative or low-323 carbon investment is deemed valuable and able to realize returns because it is capable of bearing debt. 324
325

IV Making carbon-as-asset: investment in low-carbon electricity generation 326 327
In this section of the paper, we concentrate on an important form of carbon finance that -compared 328 to carbon markets, payments for ecosystem services and investment in natural capital -has received relatively 329 little attention in human geography and social science research: the raising of capital for low-carbon 330 investments in enterprises and projects (cf. Bracking, 2015; Christophers, 2016 Christophers, , 2018 Karpf and Mandel, 2018; 331 Tripathy, 2017) . Our aim is to illustrate our agenda for problematizing carbon finance, especially as it mobilizes 332 the insights from the literature we developed above and pertains to the processes of carbon-as-asset that are 333 at the heart of low-carbon investment. Specifically, we focus on low-carbon investment in the renewable 334 energy sector and, in the interests of brevity, we concentrate on the USA and UK where energy provision is 335 largely already privatized and marketized. The energy sector's contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions 336 has made it a logical first target of public and private initiatives aimed at a low-carbon transition. As revealed 337 bringing lower costs of capital to the renewable energy sector (EWEA, 2018). We interpret this profusion of 361 financial and organizational structures as experimentation with alternative assetization processes for 362 unlocking income streams and attracting investors to the sector. Capital market creation is an incomplete and 363 adaptive process in the renewable energy sector (Hall et al., 2017) , with new actors and organizational 364 structures emerging over time in response to policy shifts (e.g. in relation to energy price support and taxation) 365 and broader developments in capital markets. That said, experimentation in the US and UK has largely centred 366 on two models of assetization to date. 367
In the more widely used project finance model, assetization occurs at the level of a specific project 368 (e.g. a wind farm or solar park): project developers establish a special purpose vehicle (a legal entity to 369 undertake the project) and debt is raised against future sales of electricity from the project. Thus, the 370 capitalization of low-carbon investment in the electricity generation sector is not simply "a dual process of 371 valuation" (Muniesa, 2012: 31) that centres on the current and future economic prospects of the corporations 372 and institutions involved. This is because project finance is provided on a limited or non-recourse basis -i.e. 373 investors' claims as creditors are restricted to the assets and income streams of the new project, and do not 374 extend to the wider assets and cash flows of the consortium of companies that own and operate the project 375 (Finnerty, 2013; Langley, 2018b) . In this way, project financing of a low-carbon asset works "like a giant 376 mortgage" as the only security for the loan is the project itself (EWEA, 2018). The project model brings together 377 a consortium of actors (project developer, operator, contractors) with debt finance typically provided by a 378 bank. Since the global financial crisis, however, bank lending to renewable energy projects has sharply reduced 379
and key lending terms (such as the loan period) have tightened. In its place, securitization and other alternative 380 techniques of project finance have emerged and, with this, institutional investors, sovereign wealth funds and 381 others that comprise the so-called 'shadow banking' sector have come to play a growing role. Miller et al. 382 (2018) highlight the diverse sources of capital currently associated with low-carbon assets in North American 383 renewable energy, including project financing via public market capital (asset-backed securities and various 384 debt products), hybrid bond financing, and even crowdfunding. Hybrid bonds are raised against a portfolio of 385 renewable energy projects with a common owner rather than an individual project, and address key challenges 386 (of space and time) associated with financing renewable energy projects. A portfolio of projects -387 geographically distributed and utilizing different technical designs -reduces risks to revenue associated with 388 localised weather conditions (around wind and solar power), simultaneous design faults and, if the projects 389 are in different jurisdictions, regulatory risks (EWEA, 2018). More generally, hybrid bonds can "expand the 390 pool of available candidates" who can finance new projects: in the US context, for example, where production 391 tax credits are a key driver of investment in renewables (see below), these bonds reach investors beyond those 392 with heavy tax obligations (Tang et al., 2012: 693) . Crowdfunding -such as through the Abundance generation 393 13 platform in the UK -is a further example of assetization processes of project finance in low-carbon energy, 394 although currently limited to early-stage start-ups where high risks and the lack of collateral mean project 395 developers cannot "assemble debt finance from banks or venture capitalists easily" (Lam and Law, 2016: 12; 396 Vasileiadou et al., 2016) . 397
The project finance model contrasts with green bonds that, despite funding a specified project or 398 initiative, are assets that are issued against the issuer's full balance sheet and earnings potential rather than 399 against the specific credentials and returns of the decarbonizing project(s) to be funded. In the renewable 400 energy sector in the US and UK, green bonds are one of the ways in which on-balance sheet funding is raised 401 (via corporate debt, or internal cash flow management for small projects), especially where larger companies, 402 such as utilities, have entered into renewables (Coughlin, 2012; EWEA, 2018; Hall et al., 2017) . As a range of 403 geographic research into the emergence and development of green bonds reveals (Bracking, 2015;  Initially, banks provided an organizational fix that enabled project finance to take hold in the 431 renewable energy sector, drawing on their capacity to issue long-term debt and negotiate key assumptions of 432 the loan agreement to translate technical assessments of energy generation into expected revenues and 433 repayment schedules. Further adaptations to the distinctive material qualities of renewables were necessary 434 to draw non-bank actors into low-carbon project finance. On the calculative side, growing availability of 435 operational data from projects has enabled more accurate projections of electricity production, and the use 436 of increasingly robust algorithms for converting local weather and climate data into calculations of revenue; 437 and in terms of regulation, price support mechanisms have evolved to bring more security to revenues. The 438 UK government, for example, has sought -with some difficulty -to implement an approach to energy policy 439 (and infrastructure more generally) that gives capital markets a central role (see Langley, 2018b This leads us to the third issue about the processes of carbon-as-asset that is, in effect, highlighted by 447 the applied and policy literature on the financing of renewable energy: the growing involvement of 448 mainstream investors in this discrete form of carbon finance has driven significant shifts in how assetization 449 occurs (Hall et al., 2017) . Rather than assembling a low-carbon asset sufficient to bear bank debt -450 characterised by long loan terms and specialist in-house/boutique knowledge -low-carbon electricity 451 generation is increasingly assembled to perform as an 'asset class'. The renewable energy sector is certainly 452 not alone in this respect, as the drive for the so-called 'mainstreaming' of low-carbon investment is producing 453 similar pressures to standardize assets across the broader market for green bonds, for example (G20 Finance 454 Study Group, 2016). The consequences of this shift in the renewable energy sector extend beyond 455 diversification of the organizational forms and devices associated with 'becoming asset' discussed above to 456 the ecologies of finance created around low-carbon energy. Specifically, it extends to how assetization and 457 capitalization may "affect the direction of the evolution of renewable energy" by differentially empowering 458 some financial actors over others (Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2018: 11) . Researchers have found significant 459 differences in risk appetite among investors in low-carbon projects with private actors favouring "low risk 460 15 much more than public ones", highlighting the importance of understanding the consequences of privileging 461 carbon finance as a mode of climate change governance (Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2018: 18) . 462
The fourth general finding we derive from the applied and policy literatures is that, as a consequence 463 of the challenges of enacting this form of carbon finance in the renewable electricity generation sector, 464 processes of becoming asset and capitalization feature various kinds of state interventions and public support. 465
State support has played a very significant role in creating carbon-as-asset in relation to the energy sector, 466 notwithstanding the way private finance in energy initially emerged via de-regulatory initiatives, limits on 467 public sector borrowing, and the introduction of price-based competition in sectors like gas and electricity 468 (Jensen and Dowlatabadi, 2017; Knuth, 2017) . Particularly important have been a raft of public policy 469 initiatives that includes tax credits, price support mechanisms (e.g. feed-in-tariffs) and renewable obligations 470 (Tang et al., 2012: 693) . This is illustrated, for example, by the wide-ranging mandate of the UK Government's 471 The landscape of climate change governance has shifted since human geographers first critically 485 engaged with carbon finance. There is now growing realization of finance's "profound potential to remake the 486 arteries through which capital flows and that are the lifeblood of the biological and social reproduction of most 487 of contemporary humanity" (Castree and Christophers, 2015: 385). This paper is an attempt to respond to 488 these developments by critically reviewing state-of-the-art research within human geography and related 489 fields in order to advance an agenda that both pluralizes and problematizes carbon finance. 490
Drawing on the existing literature on carbon markets and ecosystem services, we identified key 491 insights essential for problematizing the proliferating and multiple forms of carbon finance. The 492 commodification of carbon is a precarious achievement inexorably tied to both the means through which it is 493 achieved and to carbon's materialities, and abstractions and calculations are central to ensuring carbon-as-494 16 commodity is able to bear value. From Felli's (2014) significant intervention and a rapidly growing literature 495 that subsequently rejects a focus on commodification in favour of the production of property relations that 496 enable rent-seeking, we draw the importance for critical analysis of the significance of sovereign power, the 497 specific utility of commodification as a concept for centring attention on the extraction of value through 498 speculation, and how processes of carbon finance cannot be adequately understood as commodification. To 499 open up for analysis the forms of carbon finance that, in particular, invest in nature and raise of capital for 500 low-carbon investment, we have built on existing research that highlights how carbon is figured as an 'asset', 501 connecting our research agenda with wider cultural economy work that articulates the categories of 502 assetization and capitalization to analyse economization processes that leverage debt for capital investment. 503
From these starting points, the paper has sought to extend the problematization of carbon finance in all its 504 forms from the relatively well-known difficulties of making carbon-as-commodity to the presently under-505 researched impediments of producing carbon-as-asset. Demonstrating the potential of such an approach, we 506 turned to low-carbon investment in electricity generation, largely as it is taking place in the USA and UK. Here 507 we highlighted how the processes of carbon-as-asset do not take a singular financial and organizational form, 508 entail attempts to work around the material challenges of renewables, change as mainstream investors 509 become involved, and feature various kinds of state interventions and public support. 510
Rather than seeking to set out a singular agenda for work on carbon finance, we would hope that our 511 paper will generate further research centred on the diverse, contingent and problematic ways in which carbon-512
as-commodity and carbon-as-asset are constituted, and the consequences that this has for prospects of 513 decarbonization. Although we have drawn attention to four main forms of carbon finance -markets for carbon 514 allowances and offsets, ecosystem services, investment in natural capital for carbon sequestration, and the 515 raising of capital for low-carbon investment -there are also several further forms of carbon finance that 516 remain under-explored. For example, few studies have examined how carbon comes to be commodified 517 beyond cap and trade carbon markets or offset schemes. Work on low-carbon housing and property markets 518 is perhaps an exception, with research demonstrating how delivering carbon savings in this sector rests on the 519 identification of metrics, monitoring, standardization and verification to attract investment (Edwards and 520 Bulkeley, 2017; Lovell, 2004 Lovell, , 2015 . Carbon savings of this kind do not function within traditional markets, but 521 come to be commodified in quasi-markets that distribute and exchange forms of government subsidy or 522 philanthropic donation. Often the assumption behind these forms of low-carbon qualification is that once their 523 carbon value can be accounted for, markets will form around them. Yet so far there is limited evidence of the 524 spontaneous formation of markets around these qualified commodities in relation to housing. Recent research 525 suggests, however, that within certain urban markets for commercial property in the US, "many players are 526 now working to convert green building into a resource for real estate developers, owners, and investors, and 527 to harness those streams of green value added for new financial instruments and investment markets" (Knuth, 528 2015: 637) . This shift is significant, in terms of our argument in the paper, as it indicates a move from away 529 from a direct interest in the value of energy savings that can be derived from green buildings to "more 530 speculative manoeuvring around the investment potential of green property" (Knuth, 2015: 637) . 531
Equally, we are wary that problematizing the processes of carbon-as-asset is not narrowed to the 532 financing of the renewable energy sector. Rather, we would want to encourage research that might investigate 533 why carbon finance can be secured in relation to some forms of carbon -for example to its absence in 534 renewable electricity generation -rather than others, such as the carbon content of the retail sector or 535 energy-intensive industries, such as steel, plastic or cement. Similarly, we would also want to guard against 536 the assumption that, paralleling the attention given to carbon markets by research into carbon-as-commodity, 537 the problematization of carbon-as-asset necessarily entails a focus on processes that are solely located in 538 capital markets. Chinese banks, for instance, are the subject of incentives and guidance by the People's Bank 539 of China and other regulatory agencies designed to privilege loans in support of low-carbon entities and 540 projects, and there is pressure for similar arrangements that reward the capitalization of low-carbon assets to 541 be incorporated into the macroprudential regulation of banking elsewhere (Campiglio 2016) . Banks are 542 increasingly interested in the carbon credentials of the assets in their loan portfolios, not least because central 543 banks are coming to regard climate change and the prospect of a sudden collapse in the valuations of carbon-544 intensive economic entities as material to financial stability. The Financial Stability Board's Task Force on 545
Climate-Related Disclosures (2017) has, for instance, recently published a set of voluntary metrics and 546 measures that seem likely to feature strongly in the processes by which banks calculate the 'high carbon' 547 qualities of the brown assets on their balance sheets and thus the extent of their exposure to the so-called 548 'carbon bubble'. Climate change risk and the production of what we might term 'high-carbon-as-asset' is also 549 presently at the heart of divestment campaigns in support of decarbonization by pension funds and other 550 institutional investors, although it is noticeable that not all pension funds regard divestment as necessary or 551 as the most appropriate response to climate change (Stausball, 2015) . A pluralized research agenda for carbon 552 finance that extends to problematizing the processes of carbon-as-asset can, therefore, be taken in new 553 directions, where the pertinent questions centre on the 'unbecoming' of high-carbon assets and asset classes. 554
What is clear, however, is that interrogating the relations between carbon's material form, its abstraction, 555 capitalization and political economy will be key if we are to understand the potential for carbon finance to act 556 as the 'game changer' for climate futures it is presently heralded to be. 
